Defendant contends that the wharf was dedicated to public use, when map of the road and wharf was filed. This is certainly the rule as to roads, parks, etc. (*Price* v. *Inhabitants of Plainfield*, 40 N. J. Law 608). In Tiedeman on Real Property, page 579, it says, "any act such as platting and recording a map, in which the streets are laid out, which shows a clear intention to dedicate the land to the public use will be sufficient." But the court finds a distinction between a wharf and a street based on the case of *O'Neill* v. *Annett*, 27 N. J. Law 290, 295, which says that the principle of dedication does not extend to public landings.

EQUITY—INJUNCTION—PROTECTING EASEMENT—IVES V. EDISON, ET AL, 83 N. W. 120.—Where, by deed conveying to complainant a store in a block, there was granted to her an easement in a flight of stairs leading to the second story, at the point at which the stairs were then located, and she refused permission to change the location of the same, and commenced suit to enjoin the change before it occurred, she is entitled to an injunction, though, after the bill was dismissed, defendants, without waiting for the appeal, made the change, so that the restoration of the stairs will cost them more than a jury might consider it worth to the complainant. Hooker, J. and Long, J., dissenting.

As a general rule equity will only grant an injunction when irreparable injury has been done, or is threatened. *Starkie* v. *Richmond*, 155 Mass. 188; *Hall* v. *Rood*, 40 Mich. 46; 3 *Pom. Ex. Jur.* §1295, note. Irreparable injury does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury. It means that the injury must be a grievous one, and not adequately reparable in damages. *Kerr on Injunctions*, p. 199, c. 15, §1. *Switzer* v. *McCulloch*, 76 Va. 777. The court seems to have thought that damages from repeated suits would not have compensated the complainant and therefore granted this injunction. The dissenting judges hold that this case would have its appropriate remedy in a court of law and that an injunction should not be granted. There are many cases similar to this, the decisions of which have been varied between the two opinions given above. The weight of authority may be said to be on the court side.

FORGERY—NOTE—LACK OF REVENUE STAMP—INVALIDITY OF INSTRUMENT —NOTE GOOD ON FACE—KING V. STATE, 57 S. W. 840.—A forged note did not bear a revenue stamp and the forged signature was that of a married woman without her husband joining. *Held*, no defense. Henderson, J., dissenting.

As there was nothing on the note to show that the one by whom it purported to be made was a married woman, it is not relieved of its forged character, since to be void, the invalidity must appear on the face of the forged instrument. *Bishop Cr. Law*, 539. 3 *Chit. Cr. Law*, 1035. 13 *Am. & Eng. Enc. Law*, 1088. Lack of a revenue stamp to a forged instrument is no defense. *Thomas* v. *State*, 51 S. W. 242. The dissenting Justice contended that an instrument to be the subject of forgery must be such as would, if genuine, create a valid obligation. *Coffey* v. *State*, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 198. *Johnson* v. *State*, 51 S. W. 382.

INSURANCE—DISAPPEARANCE OF INSURED—COMPROMISE—SEARS V. GRAND LODGE OF ANCIENT ORDER OF UNITED WORKMEN—57 N. E. 618.—One insured for $2,000 in the defendant's society disappeared, and was not heard of for nine years. His widow believing him dead sued on the policy. To dispose of the suit it was agreed that the defendant should pay $666 of the insurance, which was in no event to be returned, and to pay the remaining $1,334 in sixteen months, if insured did not return in the meantime. Before the $666 was paid the insured returned. *Held*, that the defendant must nevertheless pay the $666. J. Graw dissenting.